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Making a rather ambitious, broad-form decision, the Israeli Supreme Court
(ISC) in 2009 ruled that privatization of prisons is a per se violation of human
rights, in particular the rights to liberty and dignity.1 The Court ruled that it was
not the often deleterious consequences of privatization that violated the rights to
liberty and dignity, but that privatization of prisons by itself was a violation.2 This
decision has been subject to much negative commentary and criticism3 with most
analyses focusing on the Court’s argument on the right to liberty. Scholars that
have dismissed the opinion seemed to have misread it, often grounding their
counter-arguments with faulty and wildly abstract premises that misrepresent the
human rights issues at stake. This article focuses on the Court’s novel argument
on the right to human dignity, and especially how privatization of prisons turns
inmates into commodities. While this argument may have been under-developed

1.
2.

3.
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HCJ 2605/05 Academic Ctr. of Law & Bus. v. Minister of Fin., 63(ii) PD 545 [2009] (Isr.), English
translation available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/05/050/026/n39/05026050.n39.pdf
[hereinafter Prison Case].
As per the Israeli Basic Law: Human Dignity and Libety, SH No. 1391, § 8 (Isr.), English
translation available at https://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm [hereinafter
Israeli Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty]. For an overview of the different problems
associated with private prisons, see Uri Timor, Privatization of Prisons in Israel: Gains and Risks,
39 ISRAEL L. REV. 81, 82-84 (2006) (noting in particular the problems of oversight over private
prisons by governmental agencies, the fact that private prisons are not focused on rehabilitation
of prisoners, and challenging the claim that private prisons are actually more efficient); Christine
Bowditch & Ronald S. Everett, Private Prisons: Problems within the Solution, 4 JUST. Q. 441
(1987) (explaining that efficiency factors are clouded when privatization occurs for the entire
infrastructure, plus free market competition is well-nigh impossible for prisons); Rachel Christine
Bailie Antonuccio, Prisons for profit: Do the Social and Political Problems Have a Legal Solution?,
33 J. CORP. L. 577 (2008) (stating that while a non-delegation challenge would be difficult under
constitutional standards, problems with private prisons given strive for profit margins and
internal staff issues indicate that more regulation is required); Michael Brickner & Shakyra Diaz,
Prisons for Profit: Incarceration for Sale, 38 HUM. RTS. 13 (2011) (stating that key problems with
private prisons include profit maximizing, staffing issues, lack of accountability to state, and
overall poor treatment of prisoners); CODY MASON, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, TOO GOOD TO BE
TRUE:
PRIVATE
PRISONS
IN
AMERICA
17
(Jan.
2012),
available
at
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_Too_Good_to_be _True.pdf (noting dubious costsaving results and inadequate care overall). But cf. Malcom M. Feely, The Unconvincing Case
Against Private Prisons, 89 IND. L. J. 1401, 1418 (2014) (asserting that the key argument against
private prisons, i.e., the state as holding the monopoly for punishing its citizens given state
sovereignty and the implied social contract, is misplaced since the state may delegate its powers
to private entities); id. at 1426-28 (noting that privatization of prisons in Australia can be viewed
as a successful venture); Kevin A. Wright, Strange Bedfellows? Reaffirming Rehabilitation and
Prison Privatization, 49 J. OFFENDER REHAB., 74, 74 (2010) (noting that empirical findings
concerning private prisons and their affects are ambiguous and that “no clear pattern exists as
to whether private prisons outperform public prisons”); Peter H. Kyle, Contracting for
Performance: Restructuring the Private Prison Market, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2087 (2013)
(asserting that instead of criticizing prison privatization, focus should lie on creating adequate
performance-based measurements like reduced recidivism and increased employment as a means
of ensuring a better private framework).
See discussion infra Part II.
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in the Court’s opinion, teasing out and expanding on the Court’s logic could provide
an important new avenue to consider when litigating matters that pertain to the
fundamental human right to dignity in other forums, both domestic and
international.
The Israeli Court decision briefly mentions that similar decisions have not been
made in other forums and cited a brief that suggested that “were arguments of this
kind to be raised before those courts, they would not be expected to be successful.”4
This paper argues instead that the logic of the Israeli decision on the human rights
to dignity could be successful in other jurisdictions, especially those that have
strong case law on the rights of vulnerable populations and the right to human
dignity, such as South Africa, the African Commission of Human and Peoples’
Rights, and the Inter-American Human Rights system. Indeed, the viable
contentions based on the human right to dignity that could be raised before the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights serve as potential grounds for
challenging the widespread privatization of prisons in the United States.
This paper begins with an analysis of the Israeli prison privatization case with a
focus on the Court’s finding of a per se violation of the human right to dignity. The
second section analyzes two previous commentaries of the Israeli case to show how
even those in agreement with the Court’s decision have misread the case. This
analysis provides a deeper and more nuanced reading of the Israeli Court’s logic on
the human right to dignity, especially how the commodification of inmates in a
private prison inherently is a violation of that right at least in the Israeli context.
The third section expands upon the Court’s reasoning through a discussion of what
has been referred to as “cauterization,”5 which involves branding a group as
inferior, sealing it off from the social and political sphere, and reducing sympathy
for its members. Interestingly, the same logic was also used in a recent
groundbreaking mental health decision, Purohit and Moore v. Gambia,6 a case
before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The fourth section
teases out the key elements of the Israeli decision to show which elements would
need to be present to successfully bring such a case in other jurisdictions. These
elements are present not only in the Israeli context, but also in the African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the South African Constitutional
Court, and the Inter-American Human Rights system.

4.
5.
6.

Prison Case, supra note 1, at 60 (referring to an expert opinion authored by UK academic
Professor J. Jowett and submitted by the Government, one of the defendants to the case).
See WILLIAM PAUL SIMMONS, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND THE MARGINALIZED OTHER 10-12 (2011).
Purohit and Moore v. The Gambia, Comm. No. 241/2001, 11 Int’l Hum. Rights Rep. 257 (Afr.
Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights 2003), available at http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions
/33rd/comunications/241.01/achpr33_241_01_eng.pdf [hereinafter Purohit v. Gambia].
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I.

The Israeli Case

The Israeli Supreme Court, acting as the High Court of Justice, held in 2009 by
an 8-1 margin that the Israeli law creating the country’s first privatized prison
violated Israel’s Basic Law: Human Dignity,7 not because of the potential
consequences of the privatization, but because privatization inherently violated the
human dignity of prisoners.
The Court’s opinion, crafted by (then) Supreme Court President Beinisch, has
been subject to serious criticism by legal scholars, even by those who agree with
the ultimate outcome.8 One central ground for rebuking criticism is to recognize
the nuances offered in the opinion,9 most notably Judge Beinisch’s arguments
against the commoditization of inmates through prison privatization. As Judge
Beinisch writes, “allowing a private concessionaire of a prison to make financial
profits, disproportionately violates human rights and the principles required by the
democratic nature of the regime.”10 It is the branding of prisoners as “means for
the private corporation,” or the commodification of prisoners, that is at the heart of

7.

8.

9.
10.
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The Basic Laws are meant to serve as the framework for an eventual written constitution; they
are equivalent to any other law except that in some of the Basic Laws, an entrenchment provision
requires a special majority vote by the Knesset (Israeli Parliament) prior to any change. See David
Kretzmer, The New Basic Laws on Human Rights: A Mini-revolution in Israeli Constitutional
Law?, in PUBLIC LAW IN ISRAEL 144-45 (Itzhak Zamir & Allen Zysbaltt eds., 1996); Stephen
Goldstein, Protection of Human Rights by Judges: the Israeli Experience, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 605,
606 (1994).
The critics can be placed into two distinct groupings. The first group is comprised of those who
assert that the court was inherently incorrect in deeming the matter a violation of human dignity
since the focus should be on the state as an integrated actor in the market. See Alexander Volokh,
Privatization and the Elusive Employee-Contractor Distinction, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133 (2012)
(arguing that the issue demands a proper empirical accounting of public and private entities)
[hereinafter Volokh, Employee-Contractor Distinction]; Hila Shamir, Privatization: The State, the
Market and What is Between Them – in Light of the Supreme Court Decision on Prison
Privatization, 35 IYUNEI MISHPAT 747 (2013) (in Hebrew) (asserting that the state is inherently
part of the market economy such that the state and market coexist); Daphne Barak-Erez, The
Private Prison Controversy and the Privatization Continuum, 5 LAW & ETHICS OF HUM. RTS. 138
(2011) (arguing that the Court properly considered human dignity issue, but did not address
broader matters concerning privatization).
The second group of critics assert that human dignity is an issue, but the Court erred in its
approach and reasoning. See Barak Medina, Constitutional Limits to Privatization: The Israeli
Supreme Court Decision to Invalidate Prison Privatization, 8 I. CON. 690 (2010) (arguing that the
preferred focus of the Court should have been on the division of governmental powers); Alon
Harel, On the Limits of Privatization in Light of the Supreme Court Case on Prisons, 2 MISHPATIM
ONLINE 1 (2010) (in Hebrew) (asserting that the issue of human dignity centers on the moral
capacity to punish another person, aligning with Procaccia’s approach, discussed infra); M. Tamir
& A. Harel, On Human Dignity and Privatization in Light of the Supreme Court on Prisons, 41
MISHPATIM 663 (2012) (in Hebrew) (asserting that the focus of case should be on the human right
to free will and choice capacities).
That for some, at least, seem to be missed by these commentators.
Prison Case, supra note 1, ¶ 54, at 94.
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the Court’s reasoning, and it tips the scale to a violation of human dignity. Far
from being an irrational stance, this logic also underpins Judge Beinisch’s previous
ruling, when she held that corporal punishment is a per se violation of human
dignity,11 and it is ultimately a strong ground for a potential submission before the
Inter-American Commission of Human Rights when considering challenges to
Arizona’s rampant prison privatization as a per se violation of the American
Declaration of Human Rights.
A. Factual Background of the Israeli Case
Given a shortage of prison space in Israel, along with poor prison conditions and
rising administrative costs, Israel decided to look into the matter of prison
privatization in 2003.12 On March 24, 2004, the Knesset (Israeli Parliament)
passed an amendment to the Prison Law.13 The amendment provided the means
for submitting private bids, the conditions that must be maintained in the prison,
the scope of jurisdiction held by the private facility over the prisoners, and the
scope of oversight to be maintained by the state over the private concern operating
the prison.14 Choosing from three different privatization models,15 the Knesset
favored the UK model of prison privatization by allowing the private company to
ensure order and prevent escapes, yet limited its capacities to actually punish the
prisoners.16 Thus, solitary confinement was to be limited to 48 hours at a time,
and the prison guards were considered public employees.17
After a tender was awarded to ALA Management and Operation Ltd. to build a
11.
12.

13.
14.
15.

See discussion infra note 48 and accompanying text.
Prison Case, supra note 1, ¶1, at 34. Justice Proccacia, in her concurrence, wrote that the main
purpose of amendment 28, as derived from its legislative background and context, is “to promote
the welfare of the prison inmate by reducing the serious overcrowding that currently exists in the
prisons, improving the services provided in them and expanding the treatment and rehabilitation
programmes available to the inmate.” Id. at 28. See also Amy Ludlow, Prison Privatization in
Israel: Important Transnational Lessons, 6 CAMBRIDGE STUDENT L. REV. 326, 326-27 (2010).
Prisons Ordinance Law (Amendment No. 28), 5764-2004, SH No. 348 (Isr.) (in Hebrew).
Prison Case, supra note 1, ¶¶11-12, at 44-48.
The French model only allows a private concern to provide specific logistical services like food or
medical care, whereas the American model provides complete control to the private concern,
including punishment capacity within the prison. The UK model gives the private concern broad
administrative control over the prison, but any form of punishment is to be meted out by the
state. See Shamir, supra note 8, at 756-57. Specifically,
[The Israeli law] is a unique and experimental model, which constitutes a ‘pilot’ test that is
expressly limited to one prison and includes mechanisms to protect the rights of the
inmates and effective supervision and intervention mechanisms that are available to the
state and will allow it, inter alia, to reverse the process at any stage and take back control
of the prison because of a breach of the terms of the permit given to the concessionaire.

16.
17.

Prison Case, supra note 1, ¶ 5, at 38.
Shamir, supra note 8, at 756-57 (noting that originally, the French model was favored).
Id.
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prison in the southern part of the country, a challenge was filed in 2005 by the
Human Rights Division of the Academic Center of Law and Business in Ramat
Gan against the Minister of Finance, Minister of Public Security, ALA
Management and Operation Ltd., and the Israeli Parliament.18 During the time
that it took the Court to actually issue its decision, ALA Management had
completed building the private prison and was in the midst of hiring personnel to
operate the facility.19
The petitioners contended that privatization of prisons was an inherent
violation of the prisoners’ rights to liberty and human dignity,20 that under the
Basic Law: Government,21 the government cannot transfer its responsibilities to a
private actor,22 and that private operators would be inclined to undermine
prisoners’ rights by cutting corners and maintaining their profit margins.23
B. Privatization as a Per Se Violation of Israeli Prisoners
The Court held that privatization is a per se violation, and therefore it did not
need to reach a judgment on the consequences of privatization, as a decision on the
consequences would be based upon “a future violation of human rights and there is
no certainty that this will occur.”24 Since the evidence is “ambiguous” as to
whether the private prison would be more abusive of inmates than public
facilities,25 the Court relied on the per se argument that privatization is a violation
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

23.
24.

25.
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Prison Case, supra note 1, at 27.
See Ludlow, supra note 12, at 327.
Prison Case, supra note 1, ¶ 2, at 36.
Israeli Basic Law: the Government (Amendment No. 4), 5752-1992, SH No. 1124 of the 24th Elul,
5744 (Sept. 21, 1984), at 220, English translation available at http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/1960-1969/Pages/Basic%20 Law-%20The%20Government%20-1968-.aspx.
Prison Case, supra note 1, ¶ 3, at 37. The court dismissed this argument, noting that the clause
regarding the prohibition of power delegation by the government is only recommended. Id. ¶ 63,
at 100. Justice E.E. Levy, in his dissent, made a similar point, noting, “The state has not divested
itself of its powers but merely exchanged them for supervisory powers. It is hard to see how this
conflicts with the constitutional role of the government, and the mechanisms of indirect
government should be examined on their merits.” Id. at 29. See also Medina, supra note 8, at 6
(pointing out that: “In line with the prevailing view in other jurisdictions, prison privatization was
assumed to meet the non-delegation challenge as long as a public body provides sufficiently
detailed guidelines for running the prison, and applies effective supervisory powers.”).
Prison Case, supra note 1, ¶ 4, at 37.
Id. ¶ 19, at 57. Interestingly, Justice Levy’s dissenting opinion also called for the law to be
properly played out prior to making a decision on a violation of human dignity. Id. at 29 (“It is
premature to determine whether a private prison will violate human rights
disproportionately. Time will tell. The law should be put to the test before the court reaches
any conclusions on this matter.”).
See Wright, supra note 2; Clifford J. Rosky, Force, Inc.: The Privatization of Punishment, Policing,
and Military Force in Liberal States, 36 CONN. L. REV. 879, 946 (2004) (responding to scholars
who “suggest that private punishment, policing, and military corporations violate human rights
more often than public punishment, policing, and military institutions. But this claim has been

Privatization of Prisons in Israel and Beyond

of inmates’ rights, particularly the right to liberty and the right to human dignity.
The Israeli Supreme Court starts from the stance that imprisonment is an
outlier, that is, it is not a normal state of affairs. The state is already in a tenuous
position vis-à-vis an inmate’s rights by the very fact of imprisonment, an action
that is a violation of a person’s personal liberty, although one that is justified.26
This first premise of the Court’s argument has been overlooked in many of the
case’s critiques, where the focus is on the inherent nature of privatization in a
neutral and free market, where monies are regularly exchanged for services
(equating, for example, the state-contractor relationship and the state-employee
relationship).27
Justice Beinisch, however, focuses on a different type of inherence—one where
“we examine the extent of the violation of the right to personal liberty inherent in
placing a person under lock and key.”28 The focus then is on imprisonment and the
lived experience of the inmates and not the exchange of currency for services.
According to Justice Beinisch, from this tenuous position regarding the right to
liberty, any modification to the accepted form of imprisonment would risk tipping
the scales to an abuse of inmates’ rights.29
To understand how privatization undermines personal liberty we must ask
what added risks to personal liberty are inherent in the privatized prison model,
even when following the extensive regulations of the UK model, as adopted in
Israel. Despite protective regulations, prison employees must exercise discretion
when they “are in control of the managing the lives of the inmates in the prison on
a daily basis,”30 including “dealing with unexpected situations in the course of
direct contact with the inmates and making quick decisions on an immediate basis,
where the supervision and scrutiny of the making of the decisions and the manner

26.

27.
28.
29.
30.

vigorously and carefully contested, and there is very little empirical evidence to support it”).
See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 10, 999 UNTS 171, G.A. Res.
2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200A (XXI) (Dec. 16 1966) (treating prisoners with dignity, with a
focus on rehabilitation and not punishment); United Nations, Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/611, annex 1, ESC Res. 663C, (XXIV) (1957), U.N.
ESCOR, Supp. No. 1, at 11, U.N. Doc. E/3048 (1957), amended by ESC Res. 2076, (LXII) (1977),
U.N. ESCOR, Supp. No. 1, at 35, U.N. Doc. E/5988 (1977), available at
https://www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal
_justice/UN_Standard_Minimum_Rules_for_the_
Treatment_of_Prisoners.pdf; Sara A. Rodriguez, The Impotence of Being Earnest: Status of the
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners in Europe and the United
States, 33 CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 61 (2007) (arguing that the UN Standard Rules still
maintain relevance for domestic development of standards for prisons).
See, e.g., Volokh, Employee-Contractor Distinction, supra note 8. See also discussion, infra note 54
and accompanying text.
Prison Case, supra note 1, ¶ 30, at 70.
See id. ¶33, at 73. See also id. ¶ 39, at 78 (extending this argument in the human dignity context).
Id. ¶ 31, at 71.
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of exercising the discretion can only be carried out retrospectively.”31 Thus,
decisions that go to the heart of personal liberty, a right that is already greatly at
risk in the prison context, are made by those working for “a private corporation
motivated by economic considerations of profit and loss.”32 Therefore, the risk to
personal liberty “is inherently greater than the violation of the same right of an
inmate when the entity responsible for his imprisonment is a government
authority that is not motivated by those considerations.”33 However, this is a
consequentialist argument that would require, and could be refuted by, empirical
evidence.
As such, Justice Beinisch instead argues that privatization constitutes a per se
violation of the right to liberty. This would be a violation “even if the term of
imprisonment that these two inmates serve is identical and even if the violation of
the human rights that actually takes place behind the walls of each of the two
prisons where they serve their sentences is identical.”34 Her logic for a per se
violation of the right to liberty rests on two principles. First, that the right to
liberty is already violated by imprisonment, and second, that punishment
administered by a private prison has less legitimacy than punishment by a public
entity.35 In a liberal state, according to Justice Beinisch, the state monopoly of the
criminal justice system is fundamental to the social contract establishing the
state,36 in particular the constitutional principles of Israel. He asserts that “the
subordination of the various security services to the elected government has
always been one of the hallmarks of the State of Israel as a modern democratic
state, and it is one of the basic constitutional principles underlying the system of
government.”37 Thus, punishment removed from state authorities would reduce its
democratic legitimacy and is also more likely to lead to abuses.
The argument for a violation of personal dignity tracks the argument for
personal liberty. Section 2 of the Israeli Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty
states, “One may not harm the life, body or dignity of a person.”38 If the resulting
31.
32.
33.
34.

35.
36.

37.
38.
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Id.
Id. ¶ 33, at 73.
Id.
Prison Case, supra note 1, ¶ 33, at 73 (referring to a comparison between a prisoner in a public
prison as opposed to a prisoner in a private prison). See also Harel, supra note 8 (acknowledging
that this is the central reasoning of the case (albeit, Harel is inclined towards Procaccia’s more
pragmatic view of focusing on the reasoning of private bodies and their reliance on cost factors)).
See Prison Case, supra note 1, ¶ 39, at 77-78.
Prison Case, supra note 1, ¶ 23, at 61-63. For an argument concerning the importance of the state
monopoly power, see Richard Harding, State Monopoly of “Permitted Violation of human rights”:
The Decision of the Supreme Court of Israel Prohibiting the Private Operation and Management of
Prisons, 14 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 131 (2012).
Prison Case, supra note 1, ¶ 24, at 64.
Israeli Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, supra note 2, § 2.
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circumstances in the private and public domains do not differ, how can
privatization be a violation of Section 2? How can Justice Beinisch hold that one of
two contexts that potentially provide the same treatment is more violative of
personal dignity?
Justice Beinisch’s argument begins with the premise that inmates may have
lost their “liberty and freedom of movement, as well as additional rights[,] . . . but
an inmate of a prison does not lose his constitutional right to human dignity.”39
And yet, the prison context must be seen as inherently violating the right to
personal dignity, although justifiably so. However, the dignity of inmates in such a
special situation is tenuous and must be recognized as such. Quoting Justice
Mazza, the dignity of an inmate holds a special place in and for society as a whole:
Moreover, a violation of the human dignity of a prison inmate does
not merely affect the inmate, but also the image of society.
Humane treatment of prison inmates is a part of a humane-moral
norm that a democratic society is required to uphold. A state that
violates the dignity of its prison inmates breaches the obligation
that it has to all of its citizens and residents to respect basic
human rights (referring to 4463/94 Golan v. Prisons Service 50(iv)
PD 136 (1996)).40
Again, this is not an abstract matter of an analogy with the contractor versus
employee. Instead, we are in a special context where the “basic human rights”
guarantees of the state are already precarious—a context where the state is
already prone to violate the right to personal dignity.
With human dignity of inmates so crucial41 and yet so tenuous, “the question

39.
40.
41.

Prison Case, supra note 1, ¶ 35, at 74.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Judge Beinisch quotes the broad definition of human dignity from previous Israeli court
decisions:
Human dignity is based on the autonomy of the individual will, the freedom of choice and
the freedom of action of a human being as a free agent. Human dignity relies on the
recognition of the physical and spiritual integrity of a human being, his humanity, his
worth as a human being, all of which irrespective of the degree of benefit that others derive
from him.
Id. ¶ 34, at 74 (quoting Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Knesset (unreported decision
of May 11, 2006)) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added). Note that human dignity under
Israeli law is quite broad, with limitations being imposed when conflicting with the public
interest, but otherwise serving as a key ground for protecting human rights. See Ariel L. Bendor
& Michael Sachs, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Concept in Israel and Germany, 44 ISR. L.
REV. 25 (2011); Doran Shultziner & Itai Rabinovic, Human Dignity, Self Worth, and Humiliation:
A Comparative Legal-Psychological Approach, 18 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 105 (2012)
(explaining that human dignity generally focuses on protecting a person’s self worth and calling
for a more objective standard of human dignity based on a legal-psychological understanding). See
also HCJ 355/79 Katalan v. Prisoner Services 34(iii) PD 294 [1980] (Isr.) (holding that intrusive
drug searches, such as enemas, violate the human dignity of prisoners returning from weekend

495

13 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 487 (2015)

that we need to decide in this case is whether imprisoning a person in a privately
managed prison causes a greater violation of his human dignity than imprisoning
him in a public prison.”42 To answer this question Justice Beinisch returns to the
meaning of human dignity—”no one denies that the right to dignity applies with
regard to preventing the denigration of a person and preventing any violation of his
human image and his worth as a human being.”43
Needless to say, the imprisonment of a person, the very classification of someone
as a criminal or an inmate, would per se constitute a “violation of his human
image.” Of course, countless sources discuss the deleterious real-world effects of
branding a person as an inmate or a felon.44 However, this denigration would be
considered justified in the same way that the violation of personal liberty through
imprisonment is justified. The question is whether this branding is any worse in a
private prison?
And here, Justice Beinisch relies on the argument that
privatization commodifies inmates—they are treated as a means to an end, the
profits of a corporation:
There is therefore an inherent and natural concern that
imprisoning inmates in a privately managed prison that is run
with a private economic purpose de facto turns the prisoners into a
means whereby the corporation that manages and operates the
prison makes a financial profit. It should be noted that the very
existence of a prison that operates on a profit-making basis reflects
a lack of respect for the status of the inmates as human beings, and
this violation of the human dignity of the inmates does not depend
on the extent of the violation of human rights that actually occurs
behind the prison walls (cf. in this respect the question of
employing employees in a prison (HCJ 1163/98 Sadot v. Israel
Prison Service [55(iv) PD 817 [200]] [21]).45
Just as the loss of democratic legitimacy in privatized prisons is enough to move
imprisonment from a justifiable deprivation of human liberty to a rights violation,

42.
43.

leave).
Prison Case, supra note 1, ¶ 36, at 76.
Id. ¶ 35, a 74. To understand the central role of human dignity and the symbolic significance of
expressing disrespect, Beinisch quotes the legal philosopher Meir Dan-Cohen:
Once an action-type has acquired a symbolic significance by virtue of the disrespect it
typically displays, its tokens will possess that significance and communicate the same
content even if the reason does not apply to them . . . As long as certain actions are
generally considered to express disrespect, one cannot knowingly engage in them without
offending against the target’s dignity, no matter what one’s motivations and intentions are.

44.
45.
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Id. ¶ 38, at 77 (quoting MEIR DAN-COHEN, HARMFUL THOUGHTS: ESSAYS ON LAW, SELF, AND
MORALITY 162 (2002))(internal quotations omitted).
See, e.g., Debra Parkes, Ballot Boxes Behind Bars: Toward the Repeal of Prisoner
Disenfranchisement Laws, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 71 (2003).
Prison Case, supra note 1, ¶ 36, at 76 (emphasis added).
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the branding of a prisoner as a commodity in private prisons is enough to shift a
justifiable deprivation of dignity to a rights violation.
However, Justice Beinisch’s arguments for per se violations are contextual in
several important ways. As noted previously, she begins from the special context
of a prison and the special scrutiny that needs to be applied when fundamental
human rights of vulnerable individuals are at stake. In addition, the Israeli
context is critical for finding violations of both the right to liberty and the right to
dignity. “The imprisonment of a person in a privately managed prison is contrary
to the basic outlook of Israeli society . . . with regard to the responsibility of the
state.”46 Justice Beinisch notes that such a decision might not apply in other
jurisdictions with different views on state power and the privatization of prisons.
For instance, “both in the United States and in Britain—unlike in Israel—there is
a historical tradition of operating private prisons, which naturally is capable of
influencing the manner in which the constitutionality of the privatization of
prisons is regarded.”47
C. Corporal Punishment as a Comparison
Reinforcing this reading of the Prison Case opinion, Justice Beinisch in an
earlier controversial ruling, used the same approach to ban corporal punishment in
Israel.48 The Supreme Court, sitting as the Court of Criminal Appeals, was
presented with a case of a mother hitting her children repeatedly over the course of
several years. In defense, the accused claimed that the hitting did not rise to the
level of abuse, and that corporal punishment should be allowed for educational
purposes. Judge Beinisch noted that “we are dealing with cruel behaviour of the
mother to her children and humiliating them, regarding them as property that she
can do with what she wishes.”49 However, Justice Beinisch went further, agreeing
with the trial judge that corporal punishment is a per se violation of human rights.
While previous Israeli cases had given wide discretion to parents’ techniques for
raising their children,50 Justice Beinisch examined the issue with an “emphasis on

46.
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Id. ¶ 39, at 78.
Id. ¶ 62, at 98-99.
CrimA 4596/98 A. v. Israel, 54(i) PD 145 (2000) (Isr.), available at http://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/
sites/default/files/upload/opinions/A.%20v.%20State%20of%20Israel.pdf [hereinafter Corporal
Punishment Case]. The decision, which applied to corporal punishment within the family, was
subsequently applied to such punishment in the school system as well. See, e.g., CA 1730/00 Anon.
v. Israel 54(v) PD 433 [2000] (Isr.); CA 3362/02 Israel v. Abu Asbah 56(v) PD 6 [2002] (Isr.).
Corporal Punishment Case, supra note 48, ¶ 18, at 23.
See Benjamin Shmueli, The Influence of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child on Corporal
Punishment – A Comparative Look, 10 OR. REV. OF INT’L L. 189, 222-23 (2008) (discussing the
development of the case law in Israel).
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the child’s right of dignity, bodily integrity and mental health,”51 drawing upon the
right to dignity provisions of the Basic Law as well as Israel’s ratification of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child.52 From this framework, Justice Beinisch
concluded:
[I]t should be held that corporal punishment of children, or their
humiliation and degradation by their parents as an educational
method is totally improper, and it is a relic of a socio-educational
outlook that is obsolete. The child is not the property of his parent;
it is forbidden that he should serve as a punching bag which the
parent may hit at will, even when the parent believes in good faith
that he is exercising his duty and right to educate his child. The
child is dependent upon his parent, needs his love, protection and
gentle caress.
Inflicting punishment that causes pain and
humiliation does not contribute to the character of the child and
his education, but violates his rights as a human being. It harms
his body, his feelings, his dignity and his proper development.53
This ruling mirrors the prison privatization decision, as it is grounded in a
particular context of vulnerability (a child being dependent upon parents for love
and protection), and the decision takes a broad view of human dignity, including
the expressive harm that is inherent to corporal punishment, in that such
punishment harms one’s body, feelings, dignity and proper development.
II. Previous Analyses of the Israeli Supreme Court Decision
While several commentaries have been written on the Israeli decision, two
stand out and will highlight the broad significance and uniqueness of Justice
Beinisch’s opinion. The first, written by Alexander Volokh, embraces the
prevailing law and economics position on privatization of public services,54 that in
the abstract privatization is no different from any contractual obligations,
including the state-employee relationship found in public services. Therefore,
privatization can never be a per se violation of human rights as it is just another
51.
52.

53.
54.
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form of the provision of public services. The second commentary, by Barak
Medina, is sympathetic to Justice Beinisch’s overall argument but misreads the
Court’s commodification argument, claiming the Court has created a new right, the
right to be free from privatized prisons. Instead, we argue that the Court was not
creating a new Constitutional right but was further elaborating on the meaning of
the right to human dignity, specifically how the expressive meaning of labeling an
inmate as a commodity infringes upon that right.
A. Alexander Volokh and Veils of Ignorance
Alexander Volokh, in a 2012 article,55 presents wide-ranging arguments against
privatization as a per se violation of human rights that, if followed to their logical
conclusion, could support the very expansive position that there can be no per se
argument against privatization of any public service. Volokh asserts that at the
heart of the matter, and in the abstract, there is no distinction between employees
of the government and contractors of the government.56 For Volokh, the key aspect
of privatization is the relationship between the state and the contracted,
irrespective of whether the contracted service is sanitation, highway construction,
or the managing of people, such as inmates, who are subjected to a violation of
personal liberty and dignity. He writes:
The state is an abstract set of relationships; therefore, to act, the
state must use agents of some sort. Both employees and private
contractors are private individuals; both do things for the state in
exchange for money; both have private purposes, as well as the
discretion to follow those purposes sometimes, even contrary to the
desires of the state.57
At this level of abstraction, public employees and employees of private contractors
are equivalent. Thus, according to Volokh, any critiques of privatization cannot be
made in the abstract, but must rely on the admittedly ambiguous empirical
consequences of privatization.
His is a convincing argument if we accept the level of abstraction that he insists
upon and the playing field that he creates behind his “veil of ignorance.”
Nonetheless, like any analytical game based on a veil of ignorance, the outcome is
dictated by the level of abstraction we are willing to accept. How many veils are
we willing to cover ourselves with? How ignorant will we pretend to be about
reality? If we are to agree that we are all born free and equal, then a veil of
ignorance leading to a Rawlsian account of “justice as fairness” could logically
55.
56.
57.

Volokh, Employee-Contractor Distinction, supra note 8.
Id. at 133.
Id.; see also Feely, supra note 2, at 1418.
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follow. However, such an abstract position has no more validity than starting with
the premise that we are all interdependent individuals and that many of us
experience vulnerability.58 Moreover, if we are to change the rules of the game to
include some significant facts—facts that are clearly a condition of any real-world
circumstances—then the rules and outcomes will change. And, this is the case
with the Israeli decision and any discussion of privatization.
First, we must make some assumptions about who is being acted upon. In the
criminal justice system, in the nursing home industry, in welfare programs, and in
immigration detention and deportation systems, it is vulnerable people who are
being acted upon. Surely, the rich and powerful live lives influenced by
privatization as well. Their kids attend private schools, they golf at private golf
courses, they even drive on private toll roads, and rely on private homeowners’
associations for a wealth of services. However, the difference remains that they
are rich and powerful with important social connections. Thus, if the services they
desire are not provided in a timely, satisfactory manner, they have the means to
switch services or to endure the blow of having poorly manicured greens on their
favorite course.
Second, we are not living in an abstract world with abstract rules created
behind a veil of ignorance.59 Treaties, constitutions, and courts around the globe
have held that states have extra duties toward vulnerable individuals.60 These
duties are not just found in international human rights law, but also in the
domestic laws of almost all countries, including in Israel’s Basic Law. To start off
with a more abstract position than that would unnecessarily create an artificial
state of affairs.
Perhaps, the clearest signal that Volokh’s abstraction has gone too far is when
he argues that there is no inherent distinction between private contractors and
public employees because they both perform services for money; both groups seek
to “earn a profit.”61 In fact, “we’re all seeking to earn a profit.”62 Volokh argues
58.
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that even the profit motives of shareholders are not inherently different from
public prison guards or their supervisors. While some prison guards might be
more public-spirited than some shareholders, “investors might put their money
into prison firms . . . because they really care about corrections.”63 Yes, that
possibility exists, as does the possibility that shareholders will someday open
prisons for purely philanthropic motives. But the mere possibility of a counterexample would water down almost all definitional distinctions (and would even
approach Plato’s definitional criteria for the Forms as transcendent, eternal, and
unchanging!).64 Further, in the shareholder example, courts—at least U.S.
courts—have made it abundantly clear that corporations are by nature profit
maximizing organizations. For instance, in eBay Domestic Holdings v. Newmark,65
the Delaware Supreme Court concluded:
Having chosen a for-profit corporate form, the Craigslist directors
are bound by the fiduciary duties and standards that accompany
that form. Those standards include acting to promote the value of
the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders. The “Inc.” after
the company name has to mean at least that. Thus, I cannot
accept as valid for the purposes of implementing the [poison pill]
Rights Plan a corporate policy that specifically, clearly, and
admittedly seeks not to maximize the economic value of a for-profit
Delaware corporation for the benefit of its stockholders . . . .66
Volokh quickly dismisses the arguments that corporations are inherently profitmaximizing entities: “This strikes me as incorrect: firms don’t necessarily act to
maximize profit, nor is profit-making any part of their essence.”67 At minimum,
Volokh seems to be conflating individuals in an abstract state of nature with
individuals who have already contracted for some good, in this case profit. It
62.
63.
64.
65.

66.
67.

Id. at 175
Id. at 175-76.
See generally CHARLES P. BIGGER, PARTICIPATION: A PLATONIC INQUIRY (1968). The discussion in
Chapter 2 is particularly relevant.
eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010), available at
http://caselaw.findlaw.com/de-supreme-court/1558886.html. The case involved the company eBay,
which happened to be a minority shareholder in Craigslist, and eBay’s ability to start a company
that directly competed with Craigslist, without eBay losing its shareholder rights in Craigslist as
well.
Id. at 34.
Volokh, supra note 8, at 183. This assumption would be critical in undermining the Israeli Court
decision, which held:
[W]hen the power to deny the liberty of the individual is given to a private corporation, the
legitimacy of the sanction of imprisonment is undermined, since the sanction is enforced by
a party that is motivated first and foremost by economic considerations —considerations
that are irrelevant to the realization of the purposes of the sentence, which are public
purposes.
Prison Case, supra note 1, ¶ 29, at 69.
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would seem safe to assume that private prison corporations are not created to
provide a service in the best interest of vulnerable people. Once we accept that
corporations are inherently more likely to seek profits through a cost-benefit
analysis, even when they are implementing public policies, we have to expect the
corporation to be involved in social triage,68 where they will, within their
discretion, take on clients that will offer more benefits (read: profits) for lower
costs.69 Those most likely to be serviced by the private firm will not be the ones
most in need of services, i.e., the most vulnerable.70 Of course, the emphasis on
helping vulnerable people is often written into law specifically to counter policies
that adopt a social triage approach that would leave out those most deserving of
protection.
So, the question is not whether there is an inherent wrong to privatization at its
most abstract level, but whether there is an inherent wrong in privatization
considering the fact that much of privatization disproportionately affects already
vulnerable populations, especially where there is already a standard of special
duties to such vulnerable individuals. The key to the argument for private prisons
then is the lived experience of inmates who are commodified when held by a
private corporation.
It must also be stressed that the argument of the Israeli Court is not the
consequential argument as Volokh portrays it, that the cost-benefit analysis will
lead to greater likelihood of damages to the inmates. The concurrence in the
Israeli case relied on the argument of the consequences of privatization on already
vulnerable populations, but that argument is subject to empirical testing.71
Instead, Justice Beinisch’s argument is that the inmates are denigrated by the
very fact of privatization, by the very labeling as a commodity.72
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B. Barak Medina and the Commodification Argument
By contrast, Barak Medina, ultimately agrees with Justice Beinisch’s
conclusion, but argues that the decision would have more legitimacy if it were not
grounded in human rights, but in a “constitutional norm prohibiting the
privatization of ‘core’ governmental powers.”73 He reaches this conclusion by
reading the Court’s decision as creating a new right to be free from punishment by
private actors, “a right against privatization.”74 He writes:
The Israeli Supreme Court’s decision . . . holds that an inmate also
has an interest, which is classified as a human right, that the
discretion what specific measures will be used against him or her
(for instance, to maintain order in the prison) will be employed by
organs of the state and not by private entities.75
As argued above however, instead of creating a new right against privatization,
it appears that the Court was fleshing out the already ensconced human right to
dignity.
Medina first distinguishes Justice Beinisch’s per se argument from the
consequentialist arguments in two of the concurring opinions. He then, at least in
the early part of his paper, separates out how privatization works differently for
the right to liberty and the right to dignity; he argues that the loss of democratic
legitimacy in the privatization context leads to a violation of the right to liberty,
while the right to dignity analysis relies on a symbolic argument about the
meaning of privatization. He correctly notes that while many scholars have
previously discussed the symbolic meaning of privatization, their arguments are
rarely fleshed out adequately, and they have been unable to tie them to a
constitutional law analysis. Medina notes that while the Israeli decision aims to
create a bridge between cultural and ethical theories and constitutional law, the
Court’s reasoning is not sufficiently founded because “even if one could establish
some kind of such an essential symbolic message or ‘social meaning’ to
punishment, it has not been established that a prison operated by a private
corporation necessarily conveys the wrong message.”76
To better understand the Court’s analysis of the symbolic meaning of privatized
punishment, Medina lays out two possible analogies (elaborating on the inmates’
interests in each example), but it is striking that his examples are founded on the
premise that the Court has created a new human right not to be incarcerated in a
privatized prison. The first is a classic argument between consequentialists and
73.
74.
75.
76.
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Id.
Id. at 707.
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deontologists on the role of intention in harm.77 While the consequentialist would
only consider actual harm and disregard intentions, the deontologist sees a
difference between intended harm and unintended harm. The second example he
lays out is the difference between being harmed by an action of the executive
branch or by an action that has included legislative deliberation.78 Only in the
first example does Medina find the intention to be part of the harm itself, while in
the second example, the decision as to who authorized the act does not necessarily
have a bearing on the harm suffered.79 For some victims it might be better if the
authority came from the executive branch instead of a majority of the legislative
branch or vice versa.80
So, what of the prison privatization example? Medina concludes that the
democratic legitimacy argument of privatization, which the Court uses for the
right to liberty, is more like his first example.81 Medina then turns to the symbolic
status of the inmate argument, which the Court did use to find a violation of the
right to dignity. Here, he agrees with the Court with one important caveat:
An inmate has, at least as an objective matter, a substantial
interest in being treated as a human being, not as a mere means
for a private corporation to make a profit. If it can be shown that
prison privatization brings about such a (symbolic) outcome, it is
indeed justified to classify it as an independent infringement of
inmates’ basic liberties.82
However, Medina does not agree with the Court’s assumption that
“privatization brings about such a (symbolic) outcome,” at least not in all cases.
First, he argues that the privatization of the prisoner plays a “relatively minor
role” in constructing the social meaning of the prisoner and that it was not the
profit-maximizing private prisoner who gave the inmate his status, but “public
organs.”83
Secondly, Medina asserts that there is no clear-cut distinction between private
and public actors.84 For instance, even in the Israeli case the guards were
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classified as civil servants according to the law. Thus, if privatization evinces
disrespect, it is not clear whether we are dealing with public or private actors.
Medina concludes, “I don’t think that we should view incidents of the use of force
by a prison-guard against a prisoner as ‘actions [that] are generally considered to
express disrespect’ just because the prison staff works for a corporation rather than
the state.”85 The Court then, Medina argues, should not have made a per se
constitutional argument against privatization of prisons based on the symbolic
meaning of the punishment, as “such a conclusion is not inevitable.”86
Medina’s two arguments against a per se violation miss the mark in a couple of
respects. First, Medina argues that “the social meaning of punishment” is
determined by the legitimacy of the institutions that have issued the sentence and
not by the entity running the prison. This is probably true, but the Court was not
looking at the social meaning of the punishment, but at the image of the inmate,
an image that is already reduced by the imprisonment context. For Justice
Beinisch, the question is whether treating an inmate as a commodity worsens the
“violation of his human image and his worth as a human being.”87 Medina’s
second criticism tracks Volokh’s arguments discussed above, that there is no
categorical distinction between a private employee and a public employee. For
Medina, this distinction exists on something of a continuum. One counter to this
proposition would be to question why any legislation would ever be labelled
“privatization of prisons,” if such a concept has no meaning. Of course it has
meaning, specifically because private for-profit companies are for profit. As such,
the inmates are more likely to be treated as commodities. In Justice Beinisch’s
view, this additional dehumanization was enough to rule that privatization of
prisons is a per se violation of the human right to dignity.
While offering a generally sympathetic reading of Justice Beinisch’s decision,
Medina misses the fundamental premise of the decision, namely, that inmates are
already in a very tenuous position vis-à-vis the state, one that already jeopardizes
their human dignity. Justice Beinisch does not begin with the stigmatization of
inmates as commodities, but with inmates stigmatized as inmates. Thus, the
question is not whether inmates in private prisons are stigmatized, but whether
85.
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they are stigmatized in an additional, unnecessary way by privatization. The very
fact that a profit-maximizing corporation is involved in the incarceration is enough
to make the inmate a commodity, and thus infringes upon the right to dignity. As
Justice Beinisch writes, “the very existence of a prison that operates on a profitmaking basis reflects a lack of respect for the status of the inmates as human
beings.”88 In short, Medina’s analysis underestimates the importance of branding
in the prison context.
III. Cauterization of Inmates
Nonetheless, Medina is correct to argue that the commodification arguments are
not fleshed out adequately, or as Rosky points out, “[o]ddly, critics rarely bother to
explain the normative importance of commodification.”89 Thus, we need to explore
this branding in more detail. To do so, we first look at the recent use of the term
“cauterization” in human rights scholarship to demonstrate how the branding
process is inherent to most major human rights abuses, particularly when the
mere labeling of a person tips the human rights scales. We then briefly examine a
recent mental health case from the African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights that used analogous logic, Purohit v. Gambia, to further clarify the ills of
branding in the human rights context.
The term “cauterize” aptly describes the comprehensive way that the “Other”
has been excluded. There are three identifiable aspects of cauterization that
correspond to the term’s three original inter-related meanings. The first meaning
comes from its roots in the Greek verb kauteriazein, which means to burn with a
kauter or a branding iron.90 Such branding was historically done to physically
mark a slave or criminal as rightless, or someone as poor.91 Second, cauterization
refers to a medical procedure in which burning is used to seal off or remove part of
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the body. This procedure is most often used to stop bleeding, but it can also seal a
wound to stop the spread of infection.92 Finally, in its most metaphorical meaning,
cauterization means to deaden feelings or make one callous to the suffering of
another.93 The “Other” is then branded as beneath humanity, below those who
deserve rights. Those deemed inferior (or “rightless”) are sealed off from the polis
and its attendant form of protection (like a court), in effect treating the voice of the
rightless as an infection that must be stopped from spreading. Finally, those with
rights, the full members of the polis, deaden their feelings toward the suffering of
those who are branded as rightless.94
Of course, this logic lurks behind almost every ideology that has supported
genocide, colonization, or slavery. Examples abound. African slaves brought to the
Americas were often physically branded on their faces or shoulders.95 Even after
that practice was banned in much of the U.S., less physical, but very real, legal
branding was perpetrated by legislation and legal opinions. African Americans
were famously branded as “so far inferior that they had no rights which the white
man was bound to respect,” and therefore, they “might justly and lawfully be
reduced to slavery for his benefit.”96 Once branded as rightless, as beneath rights,
those marginalized would no longer be granted access to the courts and could not
even testify in the courts in any state, as if their voices, their perspectives, literally
did not exist.97 Of course, such branding and exclusion contributed in no small
part to the brutality suffered at the hands of genteel slave owners and
“courageous” captains of death boats, who were deadened to the immense suffering
of the rightless. As British seaman James Field Stanfield described one ship
captain, “Because of his debility, he ordered anyone to be flogged tied to his
bedpost so he could see the victims face-to-face, enjoying their agonizing screams,
while their flesh was lacerated without mercy.”98
It should be noted that the second and third prongs of cauterization are
consequential arguments, but not the type that the Israeli Supreme Court
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eschewed in its decisions. Instead, they are theorized as consequences inherent to
the branding process, not to the act that causes the branding, such as incarceration
in a privatized prison.
At least one regional human rights tribunal has found that the expressive harm
caused by such branding is a violation of the human right to dignity. The African
Commission, in its pioneering case of Purohit v. Gambia, found that that The
Gambia’s mental health legislation (the outdated Lunatics Detention Act) and its
treatment of the mentally ill at its Campana psychiatric unit violated several
provisions of the African Charter, such as Article 2 (equal protection), Article 5
(human dignity), and Article 16 (the right to enjoy the best attainable state of
physical and mental health).99 Among other things, the government was found to
have cauterized the mentally ill in the manner described above. The Commission
was troubled by the manner in which the mentally ill were labeled or branded by
Gambian law as “lunatics” and “idiots,” terms, “which without any doubt
dehumanise and deny them any form of dignity.”100 Similar to the Israeli Supreme
Court decision, this branding by itself was found to be a violation of Article 5 of the
African Charter that guarantees “the right to the respect of dignity inherent in a
human being.”101 Once branded as “lunatics,” the mentally ill were sealed off from
the polis by internment at Campana, and the patients did not have a voice in the
appeals process, as Gambian law contained no “provisions for the review or appeal
against an order of detention or any remedy for detention made in error or wrong
diagnosis or treatment.”102 Their voice was further cauterized in that all patients
at Campana, regardless of the type and extent of their illness, were denied the
right to vote in violation of Article 13 of the African Charter.103 The Gambia was
ordered to repeal the Lunatic Detentions Act and to establish a panel to review
previous detention decisions.104 It was also ordered to provide a voice to the
mentally ill through representation in the form of legal aid so that patients could
challenge their detention.105
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
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See Purohit v. Gambia, supra note 6, at 8.
Id. ¶ 59.
Id. ¶¶ 56-59.
Id. ¶¶ 27, 71.
Id. ¶¶ 73-76.
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INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA (IHRDA), LEGAL AID IN THE
GAMBIA: AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND PRACTICE 16 (2012), available at
http://www.ihrda.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Legal-Aid-in-The-Gambia-layout-2012-websitedownload.pdf. Such arguments closely resemble analyses of expressive harm. Consider Ahmed
Haque’s discussion of segregation in the U.S.:
The wrongfulness of racial segregation did not lie entirely in the gross material inequality
of social conditions maintained for whites and for persons of color, but also in a pervasive
message of racial hierarchy and white purity. To say that “separate . . . [is] inherently
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Sharon Dolovich’s recent impassioned work on the dehumanization of inmates
tracks this cauterization logic, arguing that imprisonment, which brands the
inmates as inferior, poses special risks for further violations of human dignity.
Dolovich asserts that the mass incarceration of the past twenty years has been
grounded in what she calls “the exclusionary project:” “People in prison are
subhuman, and they are polluted and unclean. They must therefore be kept away
from society, lest they defile the rest of us.”106
Similar to the Purohit case, attempts at redress are stymied by incarceration:
[W]here a defined minority of the population is stripped of both
civil liberties and, often, the right to vote; prisoners are therefore
excluded from the bargaining necessary to prevent oppression,
and, especially in a privatized context, the general public usually is
excluded from regular information about the treatment of inmates
at prisons.107
Dolovich’s writings also concur with the Israeli Supreme Court decision, that
the consequences of further degradation are exacerbated by the very notion of
being placed in a prison, since: “Prisoners facing such conditions are not free just to
walk away. They instead must remain locked inside the site of their abuse, often
in close proximity to their abuser, in what can only be a permanently traumatized
and terrorized state bereft of any peace of mind.108
Thus, prison privatization is a per se violation of prisoner’s dignity through the
commodification process, with the attendant branding process maintaining
empirical effects as well.109

unequal” is in part to say that when segregation expresses negative evaluations of one
group this is itself wrongful wrongful.
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Ogletree et al. eds., 2012).
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GLOBALISATION 91, 110 (Koen Feyte & Felipe Gomez Isa eds., 2005).
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Unfortunately, Rosky’s extended essay on privatization of force explicitly cauterizes the views of
the inmates in the discussion of commodification. He notes that the commodification critique of
privatization:
Often . . . focuses on inmates, suspects, and combatants. But I do not take this argument
very seriously. Clearly, we can aspire to communicate certain public messages to inmates,
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messages actually get across to these victims. Our actions will always speak louder than
our words, and our violent actions will always speak loudest of all.
Rosky, supra note 25, at 964 n.311.
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IV. The Fundamental Elements of a Per Se Violation of the Human
Rights to Dignity
Could similar violations of the human right to dignity be found in other
jurisdictions?110 From the discussions of the Israeli case and cauterization above,
there seem to emerge three fundamental elements necessary for a court to find a
per se violation of human dignity. First, the case would need to involve vulnerable
individuals, and the relevant jurisdiction would need to have special protections for
vulnerable populations, such as inmates. As Justice Arbel states in concurrence in
the Israeli case, privatization “abandons the prison inmate, who is already at the
bottom of the social ladder and in a sensitive and vulnerable situation, to his
fate.”111 Similarly, in Purohit, the African Commission had to reiterate that:
[M]entally disabled persons . . . have a right to enjoy a decent life,
as normal and full as possible, a right which lies at the heart of the
right to human dignity. This right should be zealously guarded
and forcefully protected by all States party to the African
Charter.112
Second, there needs to be a special emphasis on the human right to dignity. As
Justice Beinisch writes of the Israeli context, “the right to human dignity became a
super-legislative constitutional right that every government authority is liable to
respect.”113 The African Commission in Purohit also highlighted the special place
of human dignity as “an inherent right which every human being is obliged to
respect by all means possible and on the other hand it confers a duty on every
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The question was considered by the Israel Supreme Court in its decision
It should also be noted that we have not found any consideration by the courts
in Britain, South Africa and the European Union, as well as by the European Court of
Human Rights, of the question of the constitutionality of the privatization of prisons. From
the opinion of Prof. J. Jowell that was filed by the state, it would appear that hitherto no
claims have been raised before the aforesaid courts with regard to the constitutionality of
the privatization of prisons. Prof. Jowell’s opinion is that were arguments of this kind to be
raised before those courts, they would not be expected to be successful, inter alia because of
the economic character of the issue and the lack of a ground of incompatibility with the
provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights.
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human being to respect this right.”114
Finally, there needs to be a sense that the action of the government, such as
prison privatization or labeling of the mentally ill as “lunatics” or “idiots,” serves as
a direct assault on the vulnerable populations’ dignity even in a symbolic way,
such as an expression of disrespect. Justice Beinisch approvingly quotes the
following from Meir Dan-Cohen: “As long as certain actions are generally
considered to express disrespect, one cannot knowingly engage in them without
offending against the target’s dignity, no matter what one’s motivations and
intentions are.”115 Thus, the privatization of prisons in Israel, “both in practice and
on an ethical and symbolic level [] expresses a divestment of a significant part of
the state’s responsibility for the fate of the inmates.”116
The three key elements also are found in cases before the South African
Constitutional Court, as it has stressed the human right to dignity, the rights of
vulnerable populations, and the importance of symbolic dehumanization through
commodification.117 Most interestingly, the South African Constitutional Court
has directly tied commodification to the right to dignity in the prison context. In S.
V. Dodo, the South African Supreme Court, upon considering life sentences that
were primarily intended to serve as a deterrence to others but did not fit the
individuals’ crimes, held that:
Human beings are not commodities to which a price can be
attached; they are creatures with inherent and infinite worth; they
ought to be treated as ends in themselves, never merely as means
to an end. Where the length of a sentence, which has been
imposed because of its general deterrent effect on others, bears no
relation to the gravity of the offence . . . the offender is being used
essentially as a means to another end and the offender’s dignity
assailed.118
Just like in Israel, there is little history of privatization in South Africa, with
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the first private prison, Maugang Maximum Security Prison, the second largest
prison in the world, opening in 2000 and coming under intense scrutiny in the past
year.119 Furthermore, in October 2013, the South African government announced
that it will take over the management of a maximum security prison run
by G4S after the private security contractor “lost effective control of the facility.”120
Justice Beinisch conjectured that privatization would not hold the same
symbolic meaning in countries such as the U.S. and the U.K., where privatization
has such a long history. Indeed, in one of the few cases in the U.S. to challenge
privatization as a per se violation, Judge Posner dismissed the claims on
Thirteenth Amendment grounds and warned that to re-file such a case on other
constitutional grounds would be “foolish,” noting:
They will merely waste their money and earn a strike. The claims
are thoroughly frivolous. The Thirteenth Amendment, which
forbids involuntary servitude, has an express exception for persons
imprisoned pursuant to conviction for crime. Nor are we pointed to
or can think of any other provision of the Constitution that might
be violated by the decision of a state to confine a convicted prisoner
in a prison owned by a private firm rather than by a
government.121
Although conditions in privatized U.S. prisons are currently being challenged in
a number of suits throughout the country,122 a per se claim might not be justiciable
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in U.S. Courts but arguably could succeed in the Inter-American Human Rights
system. Indeed, the Inter-American system is an especially fruitful jurisdiction for
applying the logic of the Israeli Supreme Court decision. The human right to
dignity plays a significant role in the Inter-American system,123 and this clearly
applies to those incarcerated under Article 5 of the American Convention on
Human Rights, which state that “all persons deprived of their liberty shall be
treated with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.”124
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has ruled that the human right to
dignity is especially tenuous in a detention setting and that “the State has an
ineluctable obligation to provide those persons with the minimum conditions
befitting their dignity as human beings, for as long as they are interned in a
detention facility.”125 The Court even expanded the dignity standard for prisoners
to what we call a proyecto de la vida standard, calling on the state to not only
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ensure the right to dignity, but also to provide inmates with the opportunity to
build their proyecto de la vida by holding that “the Court must establish whether
the State, in fulfillment of its role of guarantor, took measures to ensure to all
inmates at the Center—adults and children alike—the right to live with dignity
and thus help them build their life plan, even while incarcerated.”126 The InterAmerican system has been quite sensitive to vulnerable persons in prison, ruling
that they are entitled to special protection and oversight,127 and holding that the
state maintains an affirmative duty to protect the many facets of an inmate’s
human dignity, including “protecting him from possible circumstances that could
imperil his life, health and personal integrity, among other rights.”128
Similarly, in a mental disabilities case, the Inter-American Court plainly stated,
“any person who is in a vulnerable condition is entitled to special protection, which
must be provided by the States if they are to comply with their general duties to
respect and guarantee human rights.”129
V. Conclusion
We find ourselves in an age where prisoners’ “very bodies now represent
profits.”130 Indeed, private prison companies can warn shareholders that reduced
incarceration levels could hurt the bottom line by saying that “[t]he demand for our
facilities and services could be adversely affected by the relaxation of enforcement
efforts, leniency in conviction or parole standards and sentencing practices or
through the decriminalization of certain activities that are currently proscribed by
criminal laws.”131 In light of this reality, it is imperative to look at the real world
consequences of privatized prisons. The rulings of the Israeli Supreme Court and
the African Commission in Purohit took seriously the pre-existing vulnerability of
the inmates and patients, as well as the consequences of further cauterization.
These decisions stand in sharp contrast to legal scholars whose arguments abstract
from the real world.
It may be possible that private prisons could enhance the dignity of prisoners by
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improving prison conditions,132 but in many contexts that seems like a fantasy. If
improving the dignity of prisoners is the goal, and incarceration is inherently
degrading, then turning to a for-private corporation seems troubling. Humanizing
prisoners does not require privatization, it requires a changed mindset about
prisoners and concrete actions that reduce violence, improve rehabilitation efforts,
and lower incarceration rates. It calls for the reversal of the cauterization process.
As Dolovich writes,
Consider what would have to change if prisoners were widely
understood to be fellow human beings and fellow citizens: Prison
conditions would necessarily be humane and the opportunities for
human development meaningful, notwithstanding the (temporary)
deprivation of freedom. Parole applications would be seriously
scrutinized, and, perhaps after some period of confinement
proportionate to the crime, those individuals found to pose no
future public safety risk would be released. And once released,
people with felony convictions would not be burdened with
gratuitous civil disabilities and might even be assisted by the state
with the enterprise of reentry.133
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